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Abstract
On average, prescription drugs cost US consumers more than any other developed
country in the world. US drug makers claim that intermediaries in the prescription drug
supply chain, companies called pharmacy benefit managers (PBM), are forcing them to
increase their drug prices. PBMs counter that the discounts they receive from drug makers
are channeled to insurers. This thesis will examine the role that PBMs play in the
prescription drug supply chain and determine what effect they have on drug prices. This
thesis will utilize a comparative static model, Structure, Conduct, Performance (SCP)
framework to analyze the pharmaceutical manufacturing and the PBM markets. Given the
limitations of comparative static analysis, this thesis will critically evaluate the conclusion
of the SCP framework and provide a more contextualized alternative. While the PBMs
profit from high drug prices, drug manufacturers are the leading cause behind increasing
drug costs in the US.
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Chapter One: Introduction
On average, prescription drugs in the United States (US) cost consumers
more than any other developed country in the world. It is estimated that the US per
capita spending on prescription drugs in 2019 was $1,229. The next closest
countries were Switzerland with $894 per capita, Germany with $883 per capita,
and Canada, with $879 per capita (Mikulic 2021). US drug makers claim that
intermediaries in the prescription drug supply chain, companies called pharmacy
benefit managers (PBM), are forcing them to increase their drug prices. PBMs
counter that the discounts they receive from drug makers are channeled to health
insurers, and ultimately the consumer (Commonwealth Fund 2019).
This thesis will examine PBM companies’ role in the prescription drug
supply chain and determine what effect they have on drug prices. This research will
also discuss the component that make up the prescription drug supply chain and
analyze how each piece affects drug prices. Additionally, determining whether
those components are outside the control of PBMs’ ability to manage costs to
consumers. This research will also provide some historical context to PBM
concentration and vertical integration with other members of the prescription drug
supply chain over the years. While also discussing how the interaction between
prescription drug supply chain participants affects drug prices and access.
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PBM companies serve as an intermediary role in the current US prescription
drug supply chain between health insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
pharmacies. Primarily PBMs manage prescription drug benefits on behalf of health
insurers for an administrative fee. PBMs also develop and maintain lists of
medications that health insurers agree to cover on their health plans. These lists of
medications are called formularies, and they influence which drugs consumers have
access to and ultimately determine patients’ out-of-pocket costs for their medicines.
PBMs can leverage enrollee buying power to negotiate rebates and discounts from
pharmaceutical manufacturers through their ability to pool together various health
insurance plans, passing the savings onto health plan insurers and consumers.
Furthermore, PBMs develop networks of pharmacies for health plan enrollees to
conveniently pick up prescriptions while also administering reimbursement fees to
pharmacies for prescription delivery services (Commonwealth Fund 2019).
The US prescription drug costs have persistently been above general
inflation for the last forty years (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). While the price
of generic drugs has seen steady decreases over time to the extent that they are
approximately 60% cheaper today than they were ten years ago. The cost of brandname medications has grown approximately 150% during the same period (Cox,
Kamal, and McDermott 2019). Brand name prescription drugs have become so
expensive in the US that nearly 1 in 5 Americans have reported skipping a dose to
prolong their prescriptions and delay paying for refills. While nearly 1 in 4
Americans also reported that they did not fill a prescription because of the out-of2

pocket costs associated with their prescriptions (Porter 2021, 2). These decisions
by consumers have tremendous consequences for their quality and quantity of life.
As mentioned earlier, pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that the rebates they pay
to PBMs are forcing them to increase drug prices to maintain the profitability of
their products. This thesis will examine the interactions between drug
manufacturers and PBMs to determine whether it is possible to ascertain who is the
main culprit behind increasing drug costs.
Traditional methodologies used to evaluate economic outcomes often use
comparative static models to examine the impact that a change of an exogenous
parameter has on equilibrium. The methodology used in this thesis is the Structure,
Conduct, and Performance (SCP) model, which is itself, a comparative static
model. The purpose of the SCP model is to trace the cause of an industry’s
performance back to its competitive market structure. Following the
microeconomic theory, industries characterized by many small firms and low
barriers to entry create competitive market conditions where each firm is a pricetaker and cannot influence the market price of their products. This pricing behavior
informs firms’ conduct to not price their products above or below competitors for
risk of losing market share or profit. As a result, the industry’s performance is such
that the economic profit of individual firms is reduced to zero, and each firm has
an equal market share (Strategic Toolkits, n.d.).
However, comparative static models present specific challenges to analysis
and policy recommendations as these models lack historical context between the
3

events of interest. While an industry’s structure can be measured in many ways,
this research used readily available data on the market shares of individual firms to
calculate their market structure. SCP relies on the microeconomic assumption that
industries with fewer firms and thus higher market shares are inherently analyzed
as less competitive. As a result, there exists the possibility that this research has
overemphasized the importance of market concentration and therefore has
overlooked other factors that contribute to an industry’s performance (StudyMoose
2016). For example, the SCP framework used in this research does little to explain
the market power accrued by pharmaceutical manufacturers through governmentgranted monopolies of patent-protected medications. It also totally lacks any
consideration of the creation or evolution of PBM companies in the prescription
drug supply chain over time. Therefore, this research will try to add
contextualization to the SCP model to understand better the causes behind
increasing drug prices in the US.
The following chapter—Chapter Two—examines the US pharmaceutical
industry according to the SPC framework, with particular attention given to the
market conditions that affect prescription drugs’ delivery and pricing behavior.
This thesis will assess what aspects of the prescription drug supply chain other than
those roles associated with PBMs, impact drug prices. In Chapter Three, there is
an analysis of the formulary-rebate scheme that characterizes the negotiations
between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The SCP framework is again
utilized to evaluate the PBM market and draw certain conclusions regarding the
4

research question, keeping in mind the limitations of the methodology.
Additionally, this thesis will explore the pricing behavior and market implications
of PBM concentration and vertical integration into health insurance companies and
pharmacy chains. Lastly, Chapter Four provides a summary of the findings and a
set of policy recommendations.
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Chapter Two: The US Pharmaceutical Industry
This chapter summarizes the US pharmaceutical industry according to the
SCP framework while considering the role that PBM companies have in the
delivery of pharmaceutical products. The first of the three aspects of the SCP model
examines the market structure of the US pharmaceutical market. It helps establish
the overall market environment that firms are operating. Some essential market
structure characteristics discussed are the number and size of the sellers and buyers,
the type of products offered for sale, barriers to entry, and whether any asymmetry
of information exists between buyers and sellers. The second aspect of the SCP
model examines the conduct of firms and how they price, promote, and develop
their products. Whether a firm decides its policies independently or in conjunction
with other firms in the market has a crucial impact on the conduct of the industry.
The third aspect examines the performance of firms, which is illustrated in the
allocative efficiencies, equity, and technological progress of the industry (Santerre
and Neun 2010, 208-211).
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Market Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry
The first part of this section covers the supply of prescription drugs and
explores drug manufacturer firm size and distribution and their relative market
power in the US prescription drug market. The second section covers the demand
for prescription drugs, which delves into demographic usage and induced demand.
While the last section covers third-party influences that either promote or reduce
the supply and demand of prescription drugs in the US.

Number and Size Distribution of Sellers
The pharmaceutical industry in this research is defined as those companies
who develop, produce and market pharmaceutical drugs for use as medications with
the explicit purpose to cure, treat or alleviate symptoms of disease (McGuire,
Hasskarl, Bode, Klingmann, and Zahn 2007). The table below shows the total
revenue of the top 17 pharmaceutical companies whose revenue was generated
within the US in 2018. These figures were taken from the various companies’ 2018
annual fillings for net revenue based on the US geographic area. Furthermore, all
the numbers are in 2018 averaged USD.
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Entity
Pfizer Inc.
Johnson & Johnson
Roche
AbbVie
Amgen
Novartis
Merck & Co.
Gilead
Eli Lilly
Sanofi
Novo Nordisk
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Bayer
AstraZeneca
Takeda
Allergan
CSL
Total:

2018 U.S. Revenue in
% of total U.S. Revenue
Billions of USD
25.32
9.017
23.28
8.291
22.76
8.106
21.52
7.664
18.28
6.51
17.56
6.254
16.6
5.912
16.2
5.769
13.87
4.94
13.15
4.683
12.64
4.502
12.58
4.48
8.29
2.952
6.87
2.447
5.41
1.927
5.32
1.895
5.22
1.859
244.87
87.208

HHI for Entity
81.306
68.741
65.707
58.737
42.38
39.113
34.952
33.281
24.404
21.93
20.268
20.07
8.714
5.988
3.713
3.591
3.456
536.351

The left-most column lists the pharmaceutical company name, and the
second column lists the 2018 US revenue for that company. The 2018 revenue is
then used to calculate the percentage of that company’s contribution to the $280.79
billion total US pharmaceutical revenue (Statista 2019). These percentages are then
used to calculate the market concentration of the US pharmaceutical market.
The four-firm concentration ratio, or CR4, is a common technique used to
measure market concentration. The CR4 equals the sum of the market shares of the
four largest firms and ranges between 0 and 100 percent, with a higher value
reflecting that the largest four firms account for a larger share of industry output.
An industry with a CR4 of 60 percent or more is considered tightly oligopolistic.
An industry with a CR4 between 40 and 60 percent is labeled as a loose oligopoly.
8

Industries with a CR4 of 40 percent or less are treated as being reasonably
competitive (Santerre and Neun 2010, 234). If we add the four largest US market
shares of the pharmaceutical firms, we obtain a CR4 of 33.078 (9.017 + 8.291 +
8.106 + 7.664), which is well within the range of being reasonably competitive.
Another way to measure market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI). This measure of market concentration is calculated by summing the
squared market shares of all the firms in the relevant market, where Si stands for
the percentage market share or percentage of industry output produced by the i th
firm and HHI = 0 < HHI ≤ 10,000 (Santerre and Neun 2010, 235).

The above table is not a comprehensive list of all the US pharmaceutical
firms and only accounts for 87.208% of the total $280.79 billion US pharmaceutical
market. However, we can make a close approximation of the level of concentration
given the information available. The above table has already calculated the HHI
contribution for each entity and has summed those figures for a total HHI score of
536 for the pharmaceutical industry.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has established some guidelines
concerning the level of market concentration that the agency believes triggers
concern about the potential exploitation of market power. The DOJ, therefore,
believes that reasonably competitive conditions hold when the HHI is less than
1,000. The DOJ treats an industry as being mildly concentrated when the HHI falls
9

between 1,000 and 1,800. While an HHI above 1800 is considered highly
concentrated (Santerre and Neun 2010, 236).
With this research’s calculated HHI of 536.351 based on US revenue in
2018, the US pharmaceutical industry appears to be reasonably competitive.
However, as we shall see in further sections, there are other factors besides the
number and size of firms that help explain the market competitiveness of the US
pharmaceutical industry and, ultimately, its’ market performance.

The Buyer Side of the Pharmaceutical Market
Demographics and Usage
Now that we have defined and identified the supply side of the
pharmaceutical industry, we need to examine the buyer side. In the US, nearly 50%
of the population has taken a prescription drug in the past 30 days. Furthermore,
this trend of prescription drug usage has not changed very much over the last 15
years (Martin, Hales, Gu, and Ogden 2019).
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Let us analyze the Martin et al. findings in Figure 2, which has been
reposted above. Older age groups are prescribed prescription drugs at a higher rate
than younger age groups at every level. Regarding age and race, there is an
interesting trend where prescription drug usage is consistent among all races ages
0-11 years old except for non-Hispanic Asian Americans who are about 8% less
likely to be prescribed drugs in this range. From ages 12-19, there is a slight
increase of no more than 3% of prescription drug usage among non-Hispanic black,
Non-Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic Americans. However, among non-Hispanic
white Americans, there is nearly a doubling of prescription drug usage in the 12-19
11

age range, 18% for ages 0-11 to 35% for ages 12-19. It is not until the 20-59 age
range there is a similar doubling in prescription drug usage among non-Hispanic
black Americans, Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian Americans. Non-Hispanic
white Americans in the 20-59 age range have the highest prescription rates among
all Americans at 52.4%. However, the discrepancy in prescription drug usage
vanishes when considering prescription drug usage among all Americans 60 and
older. Non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian and non-Hispanic white
Americans all have a similar prescription rate of about 85% when considering 60
and older (Martin, Hales, Gu, and Ogden 2019).
Below is Figure 3, taken from the Martin et al. research, illustrates the top
three therapeutic areas prescribed to each age group. Among Americans 60 and
older who are prescribed drugs, 46% are prescribed lipid-lowering drugs used to
treat high cholesterol, 25% are prescribed beta-blockers, which are used to treat
high blood pressure and heart disease, and 23% are prescribed antidiabetic drugs
(Martin, Hales, Gu, and Ogden 2019). The average American 60 and older may be
prescribed two or more of the drugs mentioned above to treat their illness. Also, the
number one killer of Americans aged 65 and older in 2018 is heart disease (Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.). Lipid-lower and beta-blocker drugs are
directly used to treat and prevent heart disease. Diabetes itself, while not a leading
cause of death in the US, does contribute to heart disease deaths as complications
with diabetes do lead to various cardiovascular aliments (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention 2021). Recall that antidiabetic drugs are the third-highest
12

prescribed drug to Americans aged 60 and older after medications used to treat
cardiovascular ailments.

Similarly, there is a connection between the leading causes of death in the
US and the type of prescription drugs prescribed for younger ages. Instead of
medications used to treat cardiovascular diseases in older Americans, we see a shift
in prescriptions drugs used to treat illnesses like pain and depression. Interestingly,
the leading cause of death for Americans 15-44 years old is unintentional injuries,
of which unintentional poisoning to include drug overdose, is the leading cause
(Center for Disease Control and Prevention. n.d.). Over 11% of Americans are
prescribed antidepressants while 8.3% are prescribed pain relief, the first and
second most prescribed drug to Americans 20-59 years old (Martin, Hales, Gu and
13

Ogden 2019). The above connection is quite striking because studies have shown
that patients somaticize their economic and social disadvantages into physical pain.
Researchers agree that the lack of economic opportunity, poor working conditions,
and eroded social capital in depressed communities, accompanied by hopelessness
and despair, are root causes of the misuse of opioids and other medications
(Beletsky, Cirrarione, and Dasgupta 2018).

Payment for Prescription Drugs
Health care coverage in the US is not a guarantee. Several different entities
assist consumers with payment for medical expenses. Private insurance can either
be through an individual’s employer or purchase private health insurance on their
own. Either way, the individual pays monthly premiums to the plan provider in
exchange for health insurance benefits that help reduce the out-of-pocket costs to
the consumer. Federal and state-funded programs either reduce or eliminate out-ofpocket costs for some consumers who qualify, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Office of Veterans Affairs (Commonwealth Fund 2020).
According to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), of
all the drugs purchased in 2014, private insurances companies purchased a little
over 35%, with about 30% purchased by Medicare, 15.6% purchased by Medicaid,
13.9% purchased by patients and the remaining 5.5% purchased by other public
programs such veterans’ aid programs, workers’ compensation, and community
clinics (Langreth 2020). Other than the 35% paid by private insurance, prescription
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drug costs are either paid by the patient at 13.9% or are paid by the US federal
government and other state governments through such programs like Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Office of Veteran Affairs. Collectively, federal and state
governments pay more than 51% of all prescription drug costs in the US.

Induced Demand
The market for pharmaceutical drugs creates peculiar market interactions
because the consumer/patient is not the one who decides on what type of drugs are
used in their treatment. Pharmaceutical drugs are defined into two broad categories,
either prescription or over-the-counter (OTC). Prescription medications must be
prescribed by a doctor to an individual and bought at a pharmacy. In contrast, an
OTC drug does not require a doctor’s prescription and can be used by multiple
people, and can be purchased almost anywhere (US Food & Drug Administration
2017).
This research will focus only on prescription drugs for which the demand is
highly dependent upon physician prescriptions in addition to consumer tastes and
preferences. The market interaction between the patient and the gatekeeper
physician creates a principal-agent problem due to the asymmetry of information
available to the patient and the physician. The patient, a layman in medicine, needs
to seek relief from an illness and seek out a physician’s knowledge. The physician
can diagnose and prescribed medication to the patient, which the patient has no
control over. It is expected that physicians are to act utterly devoid of economic or
15

personal motive when seeing a patient. Depending on the incentives and regulations
governing physician’s duties, there have been reviews that have found variations in
the quality and cost of care given to patients (Santerre and Neun 2010, 371).
When we consider the tremendous expectations placed on physicians to
balance the economic and medical outcomes of patients, those expectations become
almost impossible to manage given the overall shortage of personal care physicians
(PCP) in the US. The lack of primary care in the US is because PCPs face longer
work hours and lower pay on average than their medical specialist counterparts
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2012). In addition, the biomedical model of medicine
focuses purely on the biological factors to identify and treat disease. This
overreliance on the physical aspects of healthcare, in effect, excludes other
important factors that contribute to health, such as psychological, environmental,
and social factors (Beletsky, Cirrarione, and Dasgupta 2018). The more a physician
is overworked, the easier it becomes to prescribe a medication to a patient to treat
the symptoms of their aliment versus a more time-intensive holistic evaluation of
the patients’ needs that more adequately addresses the underlying causes of illness
and thus reducing overall healthcare costs and utilization of prescription drugs.

Third-Party Influence on Supply and Demand
Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies
An influential agent in the prescription drug supply chain and the principal
party of interest for this thesis, PBMs, specializes in managing prescription drug
16

benefits on behalf of health insurers such as large employers, Medicare Part D
plans, and other payers. PBMs serve as intermediaries in the distribution chain
between drug manufacturers, pharmacies, and health insurance companies
(Commonwealth Fund 2019). This intermediary role is meant to reduce
prescription drug costs by channeling the needs of different actors of the
prescription supply chain into a single point-of-contact, the PBM company.
Health insurers pay a fee to PBM companies, which may be based on the
number of covered individuals or on a fee-for-service basis to develop and maintain
a list of covered medications on behalf of the insurance plans. These lists are called
formularies, and they influence which drugs individuals use and determine the outof-pocket costs paid by the consumer at the pharmacy. If a patient is prescribed an
expensive brand-name medication by their doctor, the formulary allows the PBM
to identify cheaper biosimilar generic medications for dispensing at the pharmacy
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 465-6). Having the ability to place products on a health
plan’s formulary allows PBM companies to negotiate retrospective discounts or
rebates from drug manufacturers. PBM companies also arrange prescription drug
access by developing networks of pharmacies for prescription pick-up services
(Commonwealth Fund 2019).

Food and Drug Administration
Another important entity that defines the market structure of the US
pharmaceutical industry is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which acts as
17

a barrier to entry due to its enforcement of drug rules and regulations.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that the FDA is a severe impediment to the
development of life-saving therapies because of the increased research and
development (R&D) costs associated with stringent regulations on product safety.
It is also argued that the bureaucratic red tape that the FDA forces drug makers to
go through contributes to unnecessary testing and long wait times for new drug
approvals (Santerre and Neun 2010, 468-9).
The perception that government is inefficient is a self-fulfilling prophecy
where government cutbacks create heavy workloads requiring longer hours for
federal employees and ultimately loss of knowledgeable, talented individuals to the
private sector. If left unchecked, government cutbacks would continue to unravel
any government agency. In response to gradual defunded over the years, the first
law was passed in 1992, allowing drug developers to pay the FDA a portion of a
new drug’s approval process (Hawana 2020). Over the years, the FDA’s budget has
increasingly been funded by these payments by drug manufacturers, with an
estimated 32% of the FDA now funded by “user fees” (Dabrowska and Green
2020). With the growth of “user fees,” there appears to be a conflict of interest as a
drug manufacturer can pay for a quicker drug approval process and potentially get
their product to market faster and possibly capture a greater share of the market
before their competitors.
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Conduct of the Pharmaceutical Industry
This section covers the conduct of the pharmaceutical industry. The first
section explains the patent process for pharmaceutical drugs. The second section
details the distinction between innovator and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
and their respective emphasis on R&D. The third section examines the motives
behind research and development and calls into question the pharmaceutical
industry’s claim that high drug prices are used to recoup expensive R&D projects.
The fourth section analyzes the marketing and promotion of pharmaceutical
products and the resilience of branded drugs over cheaper generics to generate
revenue. The last section examines various studies conducted over the years
comparing the pricing behavior of drug manufacturers regarding branded versus
generic products.

Patent Protection
Patents are awarded to pharmaceutical manufacturers and give the firm the
right to be the sole producer of a particular drug for a maximum of 20 years
(DeShong 2004). Given that pharmaceutical products require years and often
billions of dollars to create a viable medication, it is argued that to incentivize new
drug develop, drug manufacturers need to be protected from cheap imitators like
generic manufacturers. Otherwise, there would be no economic incentive to
undertake risky and expensive R&D projects when a competitor can easily replicate
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the novel chemical compound without incurring the massive R&D costs associated
with the new drug’s development (DeShong 2004).
While the patent system does confer monopoly power to the patent holder,
the economic rationale is that it is better to have a monopolist selling a smaller than
socially desired quantity of a drug than not to have any drug at all. However, this
monopoly power can quickly become eroded because pharmaceutical patents are
granted for a drug’s chemical composition and not for its therapeutic novelty
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 466-7). Meaning that when a new drug enters the market
or is made public, it can be analyzed by a competitor’s chemist to identify the active
chemical chain or enzyme used to treat an illness. Once the enzymatic reaction is
found, the competitor chemists can add a non-enzymatic chain of chemicals to the
larger chemical compound, thus altering the chemical composition and developing
a new compound that can be patented (Lowe 2015).
The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act has hastened the approval process for generic
drugs. Generic drug manufacturers do not have to prove the safety and effectiveness
of their generic medications like novel drug manufacturers. Instead, generic
manufacturers only need to show that their generic products contain the same active
ingredient or enzymatic compound as a brand-name product. Consequently, once a
patent on a pharmaceutical drug expires, competition between generic
manufacturers drives the price of generic medications very low (Santerre and Neun
2010, 467 and 472).
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Innovator and Generic Manufacturers
There are two kinds of prescription drug manufacturers: innovators or novel
manufacturers and generic or biosimilar manufactures. The difference is that
innovator manufacturers spend a large portion of their resources developing a new
or better prescription drug. In contrast, generic manufacturers produce non-novel
drugs and do not spend nearly the same amount of resources on R&D (DeShong
2004).
The difference between an innovator and generic drugs becomes important
when considering how pharmaceutical drugs are priced. Novel prescription drugs
are much more expensive than generics. Innovator manufacturers argue that the
reason behind this price discrepancy is that it is costly to create and market a new
or better prescription drug. The time and resources required to develop a new drug
could take a decade and cost millions of dollars in personnel, tests, and side
projects. Therefore, when a new drug is approved for use by the FDA, the
manufacturer of the novel compound would like to recoup their R&D costs which
require a high price per pill (DeShong 2004).
Once a novel drug is discovered, generic manufacturers who are not
burdened with the overhead cost of research and development like their innovator
counterparts can produce the drug at a much lower cost. It stands to follow that an
innovator manufacturer who spent millions of dollars on a new drug would not be
incentivized to develop the new drug if a generic competitor could sell the same
compound at a lower price. Therefore, to incentivize innovator firms to develop
21

new medications, the US government passed several legislative measures that allow
innovator firms to have exclusive rights to the intellectual property (IP) associated
with their drug patents. However, there are time limits that an innovator has
exclusivity over a novel compound. Those time limits are intended to balance
economic profits with societal benefits (Santerre and Neun 2010, 466-7).
Even if an innovator loses its patent exclusivity, there are still other
strategies that they may employ to restrict the supply of generics. Pay-for-delay is
a common strategy used by large innovator firms who pay their competition, in this
case, generic manufacturers, to not produce their novel compound (Federal Trade
Commission 2010). The price that the innovator must pay the generic manufacturer
must be high enough to incentivize the generic manufacturer that not producing the
drug is more profitable than producing it. Fundamental market economics teaches
us that a restriction of the supply will increase demand and, therefore, price. If the
prescription drugs companies are restricting necessary medications, then people are
going to buy them regardless of the price increase, which harms consumer
wellbeing.
Another strategy used by innovator manufacturers is to sell an authorized
generic version of the brand-name drug. By law, the first company to market a
generic version of the branded drug gets 180 days of exclusivity, during which no
other companies can sell a generic product. Innovator firms merely market their
brand name product under the generic name, extending the patent exclusivity for
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another six months and building product familiarity with the authorized generic
over its competitors (Fox 2017).

Research and Development
The claim that it is expensive to bring a new drug to market may be true.
Still, there are strategies that the pharmaceutical industry uses to lessen the risk of
investment in new pharmaceutical products. The most common strategy involves
shifting the burden of financing to either the federal government or shifting the risk
of development to smaller innovator firms. As a result, many of the advancements
in prescription medications do not come from the privately-owned R&D labs of
large pharmaceutical companies, but rather from public research universities and
research programs that receive grants from government institutions such as the
National Institute of Health (NIH) (Mazzucato 2015, 75-7).
While there has been a long trend of increased R&D spending in the
pharmaceutical industry over the years, with $50.7 billion in 2010 to $79.6 billion
in 2018, that spending on R&D as a percentage of total revenues has remained
consistently around 15-20% per year, for the last 15 years (Statista 2019). However,
this trend is overshadowed by the fact that from 2008-2018, large pharmaceutical
companies spent more on stock buybacks and dividends to CEO pay than they did
on R&D (Mazzucato 2015, 32).
While total R&D spending and patent applications for drugs have trended
upwards together, the classification of new molecular entities (NMEs), drugs
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containing as their active ingredient a chemical never marketed in the US before,
has not seen the same upward trend. Of the 1,072 drugs approved by the FDA
between 1993 and 2004, only a fraction, 357, was NMEs compared to the remaining
approved drugs that were mere variations of existing medications (Mazzucato
2015, 72). We would expect that the number of NMEs would be increasing over
the years from an industry that likes to self-promote itself as innovative. On the
contrary, between 2000-2010, there was only a slight increase in NMEs compared
to the 1980s despite having tremendous technological progress in medical science
(Porter 2021, 5).
There is a distinction that should be made regarding the size of
pharmaceutical firms, as empirical evidence shows that most novel research into
NME is conducted by smaller firms. These firms are often spun-off from publicly
funded sources like university research programs and funded by the NIH to help
develop truly innovative products in critical therapeutic areas. It is estimated that
75% of the NMEs discovered have had their origin in publicly funded research
institutions or some funding support from the NIH (Mazzucato 2015, 72).
Despite the public source of the funds, the innovation and technology
developed by these small firms do not stay in public hands or even within the small
firm itself. An established strategy by large pharmaceutical companies will be to
purchase the small firm once a marketable product becomes apparent. In 2009, only
31% of drugs launched that year were discovered by small firms. By 2018 that
number had increased to 64% (Porter 2021, 8).
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Large pharmaceutical companies have in effect side-stepped the financial
burden of R&D and are merely engaged in the marketing and promotion of
pharmaceutical products. This strategy is so common that it even has its own name,
the Fast-Second Strategy. A large firm will let a smaller innovator firm deal with
the costs and risks, then respond quickly with a ‘fast second’ merger and acquisition
(M&A) if the new drug seems promising (Santerre and Neun 2010, 482). Other
than acquiring IP, large pharmaceutical companies purchase smaller firms to boost
stock prices as the M&A of a smaller business is seen as growth for the larger firm,
thus incentivizing stock buys. Or sometimes, M&As are even used to prevent
competitors from deploying better quality drugs or alternatives (Porter 2021, 3).

Marketing and Promotion
Due to the range and scope of different kinds of drugs available on the
market, drug manufacturers invest heavily in marketing and promotional activities,
given that a prescribing physician must know the appropriate medication, correct
dosage, and the properties of the drug for different patients, classified by various
characteristics, such as age, weight, general health status. It is no surprise that drug
marketers try to influence physicians’ prescription decisions by handing out short,
easy-to-read promotional material on new drugs. It is estimated that around 20-30%
of drug sales are used for marketing and promotional purposes, of which 70% is
spent on personal promotion by pharmaceutical salespeople, with 27% spent on
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journal advertising and the remainder accounting for direct mail advertising
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 474).
Depending on whether the new drug is entering a market with increased
generic competition, the innovator firm tends to devote fewer resources to
advertising, suggesting that the purpose of product promotion is more motivated by
information dissemination than by persuasion. However, evidence indicates that
persuasive advertising of new drugs by pharmaceutical salespeople target
physicians who have recently graduated from medical school are meant to create
brand loyalty and thus reinforce prescribing habits. Furthermore, leading firms’
promotion expenditures of their products appear to demonstrate market share
resilience when presented with generic competitors even when generic drugs are
sold at a considerable discount (Santerre and Neun 2010, 474-5).
Due to the effect that marketing and promotion activities have on consumer
and physician preferences for brand names over generic drugs, pharmaceutical
products are considered inelastic goods. Therefore, we could characterize the
information environment of pharmaceutical drugs as being one where persuasive
promotional activities induce habitual buying, less elastic demand, and higher
prices. When it comes to the demand for prescription drugs, several studies have
shown that the price elasticity of demand for branded medications is less than 1,
ranging anywhere from -0.18 to -0.60. For example, a 10% increase in the price of
a drug could expect a 1.8% to 6% decrease in the drug’s usage by patients (Cox
2009).
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Pricing Behavior
The cost of prescriptions drugs in the US is so high that nearly 1 in 5
Americans reported skipping a dose, and nearly 1 in 4 Americans did not fill a
prescription because of prescription costs. Conversely, profits in the
pharmaceutical industry today are the highest they have ever been (Porter 2021, 2).
The relatively high barriers to entry through the national regulatory agency and
patent exclusion rights imply that pharmaceutical companies possess a relatively
high degree of market power to price their products above the marginal costs of
production and generate larger economic profits. Furthermore, the first-mover
advantage may mean that firms that develop a new drug first can maintain a larger
market share over generic competitors given years of cultivated brand loyalty.
These non-competitive pricing practices have encouraged numerous studies
meant to examine the pricing practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers. One such
study conducted in 1988 analyzed 56 brand name drugs between 1978 through 1983
and compared how generic entrants of those 56 brand name drugs affected postpatent protection pricing practices. The results of the 1988 study affirmed the
hypothesis that with generic entry into the market, brand name drug prices did see
a decline, but at less than a one-to-one ratio suggesting that buyers are relatively
insensitive to price changes. The authors go on to surmise that a possible
explanation is that product familiarity built-up during the patent exclusivity period
extends the high price of the brand-name drug for longer as physicians and patients
continue habitual prescribing and buying practices (Caves and Hurwitz, 1988).
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Another study conducted in 1991 examined the effect of generic entry on
brand name and generic prices. The study analyzed the post-patent protection
competition for 30 brand-name drugs and several generic entrants between 1976
through 1987. Once a generic drug enters that market, the brand-name drug price
increases initially but then declines over time. The authors conclude that with every
generic entrant into the market, the brand name drug price declines 4.5% on
average. Furthermore, as more generic alternatives enter the market, the price
between generic products falls faster than the brand-name product. Lastly, despite
significant discounts, generic manufacturers often gained little market share
(Caves, Hurwitz, and Whinston 1991, 1-66).
However, a more recent study in 2008 by Tracy Regan has shown
contradictory results with the 1988 Caves and Hurwitz, and the 1991 Caves,
Hurwitz, and Whinston studies. The 2008 study did find similar results regarding
increase generic competition leading to lower overall generic prices. The Regan
study also found that each generic entrant is associated with a 1% increase in the
brand name drug price on average (Regan 2008). The literature review discusses
that the previous works to include Caves et al. (1991) and others, have estimated a
negative relationship while other studies by Frank and Salkever (1997), Grabowski
and Vernon (1996, 1992) have found a positive relationship between brand name
price and generic entrants. Using a newly constructed data set, Regan’s study finds
that brand name producers prices increase in response to generic competition
(Regan 2008).
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The most common explanation for this behavior is the generic competition
paradox. This paradox is a contradiction between the economic rationale that
theorizes that an increase in competition is associated with a decrease in
equilibrium price as more price-sensitive consumers switch to buying generics over
brand name. However, empirically we see the opposite. Regan’s work concludes
that innovator firms with branded products may forego the cross-price elasticity
segment of the market in favor of the brand-loyal segment suggesting that price
competition in the prescription drug market is confined only to the generic market
(Regan 2008).

Performance of the Pharmaceutical Industry
This section covers the performance of the pharmaceutical industry. The
first section examines the price inflation of prescription drugs in the US and
discusses possible causes. The second section considers the motive behind the
creation of new pharmaceutical products. The last section analyzes the profits in
the pharmaceutical industry.

Price Inflation
One method for analyzing the performance of an industry is to examine how
the price of its products change over time. It is expected that the product’s price
will fluctuate over time due to imbalances in supply and demand and may even rise
a little to keep pace with general inflation. However, a product characterized by
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persistent above-average general price inflation is seen as potentially harmful to
consumers as their incomes are relatively fixed compared to high inflation products
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 483). As we will see, brand-name pharmaceutical
products have been scrutinized by policymakers for their above-average price
inflation for a long time (US House Oversite Committee 2020, 2).
Historically, between the 1970s through about 1975, the price inflation rate
of prescription drugs was below the general inflation rate. Specifically, general
inflation averages 7.4%, while prescription drugs averaged 3.9%. However, this
trend reversed quite dramatically around 1980 when prescription drug price
inflation continued to grow while the general inflation declined sharply during this
period. Drug prices grew at an average rate of 9.6%, while the average general
inflation rate only increased at 5%. During the 1990s, drug price inflation matched
more closely with general inflation, which averaged 3%, while drug price inflation
averaged 5%. More recently, drug price inflation has outpaced the general price
inflation but at a lower rate than in the 1980s and 1990s, at only above 1-2% and
with few spikes that exceed 2% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021).
However, these statistics combine the average price of cheaper generic
drugs and branded drugs, obscuring that branded drug prices contribute much more
to the overall price inflation. While the price of generic drugs has seen steady
decreases over time to the extent that they are approximately 60% cheaper today
than they were ten years ago. The price of brand-name medications has increased
approximately 150% during the same period (Cox, Kamal, and McDermott 2019).
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One such example of the public’s concern over drug prices leads to the 2020
Congressional Oversite Committee that oversaw the drug pricing investigation into
Celgene, the owner of Revlimid, a medication used to treat types of cancer. The
investigation uncovered that at launch in 2005, Revlimid was $215 per pill, but
after more than 20 price hikes, the drug now costs $763 per pill. Furthermore, the
committee concluded that those price hikes were not intended to cover R&D
expenses but rather improve Celgene’s quarterly earnings to maintain and attract
investors. Unsurprisingly, the committee also found that the company’s executive
compensation system incentivized these price hikes by tying CEO pay to quarterly
earnings reports (US House Oversite Committee 2020, 4-5).
While the Revlimid case is an extreme example, there are countless others
where pharmaceutical firms routinely increase the list price of many of their
products. Drug companies typically increase the list price of their drugs at the
beginning of the year and again six months later, often by double-digit percentages.
The average price hike being 10.5%, or about five times the rate of inflation
(Hopkins 2019). Furthermore, 41 drugs have had their prices increased by more
than 100%, with a few drugs pushed past 300% like Mometasone, a topical steroid,
increased 381%, and Promethazine/Codeine, a pain reliever, increased 326% both
in 2019 (Picchi 2019).
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Output of New Pharmaceutical Products
Another measure of an industry’s performance is its level of output and how
well products are distributed amongst members of society. Regarding
pharmaceutical products, there appears to be quite a large distribution of
medications to the general population. Recall that nearly 50% of Americans have
taken a prescription in the last 30 days (Martin, Hales, Gu, and Ogden 2019).
However, due to structural conditions such as patents and marketing, the
development of new pharmaceutical products may be burdened by legislative
action meant to accelerate drug innovation.
The introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 was meant to
incentivize innovation by extending a new drug’s patent life by five years, but no
more than 14 years in total (Santerre and Neun 2010, 487). This legislation, coupled
with the industry’s tendency to repackaging already existing drugs by slightly
modifying their chemical composition, refiling for patent protection, and securing
patent exclusivity, has not seen the development of many NME, but rather the
reselling of existing drugs just under different dosages and therapeutic areas (Lowe
2015). As mentioned before, most groundbreaking work in NMEs comes from
publicly funded sources, which are later acquired by large pharmaceutical firms
that patent and profit from the publicly funded discovery. Any innovation that
would have been shared publicly is instead locked up in privately owned corporate
IP holdings.
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Profits in the Pharmaceutical Industry
As mentioned before, what is seen as excessive profits in the pharmaceutical
industry have attracted concern from consumers and politicians alike. Inelastic
demand, brand loyalty, and patents are cited as some of the main theoretical causes
of exuberant profits in the pharmaceutical industry. Historically, after-tax return on
equity in the pharmaceutical industry has been at least twice as high compared to
the same measure for all other manufacturing sectors in the US (Santerre and Neun
2010, 488).
When it comes to the sources of revenue generation in the industry, we see
that for the last 15 years, around 80% of drug revenues in the US have come from
branded drugs, while the remainder comes from generics. Interestingly, the
proportion of branded drug prescriptions dispensed in the US during the same
period has seen a decline from a 40% high in 2005 to an all-time low of 10% in
2018 (Statista 2019). Suggesting that within the pharmaceutical industry as a
whole, larger firms with branded products account for the majority of revenue
generated and are increasingly relying on their monopoly power to maintain
profitability.
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Chapter Three: Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) Companies in the US
Healthcare System
No one would blame you if you never heard of a PBM company or knew
precisely their role in the US healthcare system. The important and prevalent role
that PBMs play in the delivery of prescription medications is often overlooked,
probably due to their opaque and bureaucratic status as middlemen in the US
prescription supply chain. While PBMs never physically handle prescription drugs,
they serve as the intermediaries between insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
and pharmacies. More generally, PBM companies are third-party administrators of
prescription drug programs for employer-sponsored commercial health plans, selfinsured plans, Medicare Part D plans, and other state and federal government health
plans. The primary role of any PBM company is to develop and maintain a list of
drugs known as a formulary, build networks of pharmacies to create convenient
access to medications for patients, negotiate drug discounts with pharmaceutical
manufacturers, and process prescription drug claims (Commonwealth Fund 2019).
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Before PBMs fulfilled their role as specialist intermediaries, insurance
companies often handled their own prescription drug processing claims in-house.
However, as more Americans began to utilize prescription drug services, the need
for cost-effective drug processing rose among insurers. Eventually, insurance
companies realized that it would be more cost-effective if they just eliminated their
in-house processing departments and instead outsourced the processing duties to a
third party, thus the rise of the PBM company. While initially, PBMs were meant
to reduce administrative costs by handling prescription medication claims for
insurance companies and plan sponsors for a small fee. PBM’s duties quickly
expanded to include such services as validating patient eligibility, performing drug
utilization reviews, deciding reimbursement fees for pharmacies, while in some
cases even operating mail order and specialty pharmacies themselves (HoffmanEubanks, 2017).
Given PBMs’ central role in delivering prescription drug services, other
companies in the prescription drug supply chain have sought to vertically integrate
PBMs into their own business. During the 1990s, companies began to acquire an
ownership interest in PBMs, but regulators at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
blocked such M&As for pharmaceutical manufacturers, fearing they would exclude
competitors from the formulary. However, insurance and pharmacy companies
successfully managed to avoid regulator’s suspicion by being less involved in
formulary decisions (Feldman 2017). As a result, today there are few independently
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operated PBM companies with most PBMs being owned by either an insurance
company or a pharmacy chain.

Economic Perspective of PBM Companies
From an economic perspective, PBMs role in the US healthcare system is
somewhat controversial. One view that supports PBMs in the US healthcare system
argues that PBM’s specialization in the administration and processing of
prescription claims allows other entities in the prescription supply chain to focus
on the delivery of their healthcare products and services. This process of
specialization allows more resources to be devoted to their respected areas of
expertise, which in theory generates greater output and reduced costs to consumers.
Additionally, if drug manufacturers, health insurance providers, and pharmacies
individually eliminate the economic costs of their administration services and
hypothetically amass those administration costs together into a new entity, the
PBM. The expected result would be greater economies of scale for administrative
services in the prescription drug supply chain and an overall reduction in the costs
of prescription drugs.
Furthermore, there may be an economic justification for a vertically
integrated organization like the large corporate entities we see today that are not
only insurance providers but also contain PBM and pharmacy subsidiaries. An
insurance company may combine with a PBM company to minimize the transaction
costs associated with market transactions. By producing internally, the combined
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firm avoids the transactions costs of negotiating, writing, and enforcing contracts
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 466). If vertical integration is compatible with market
competition, there may be justification for such clustering of prescription drug
delivery companies as consumers will benefit from the resulting lower prices.
However, there is another view that is much more critical of the PBMs role
in the prescription drug supply chain. This alternative view shared by
pharmaceutical manufacturers is that PBM companies are taking advantage of the
formulary-rebate scheme as a strategy for extracting excess profits by favoring
higher-priced medications over more cost-effective alternatives. By pooling
insurance enrollee medication needs together, PBMs can leverage that buying
power against pharmaceutical manufacturers and receive rebates on medications by
purchasing prescription drugs wholesale. The PBM keeps a portion of these rebates
while the rest pass through towards the insurance plan provider (Commonwealth
Fund 2019).
Drug manufacturers claim that PBM companies have an incentive to favor
higher-priced medications over more cost-effective alternatives because the rebates
received by PBM companies are often calculated as a percentage of the drug
manufacturer’s list price. For example, suppose two medications that treat the same
disease, the first drug costs $100 and the second costs $200, and the PBM keeps
10% of any rebates it negotiates with drug manufacturers. The PBM negotiates an
80% rebate for the cheaper $100 drug while negotiating a 50% rebate for the more
expensive $200 drug. The out-of-pocket cost to the consumer for the cheaper drug
37

is $20 versus $100 for the more expensive drug. The PBM only receives $8 of the
negotiated rebate from the cheaper drug versus $10 of the negotiated rebate from
the more expensive drug. It would be in the PBM’s financial interest to favor the
higher-priced drug but doing so would push consumers away as the out-of-pocket
cost for the more expensive drug is $80 more than the cheaper alternative.
Now assume we still have two drugs, one that costs $100 and another that
costs $200, but the negotiated rebate for the cheaper drug is 50% while the
negotiated rebate for the more expensive drug is 80%. In this scenario, the out-ofpocket costs to the consumer for the cheaper drug is $50, while the out-of-pocket
cost for the more expensive drug is $40. The PBM receives $5 of the negotiated
rebate from the cheaper drug versus $16 of the negotiated rebate from the more
expensive drug. Both the consumer and PBM benefit from this arrangement of a
higher-priced drug with a high rebate. Therefore, illustrating the drug
manufacturers’ argument that PBMs leverage formulary placement and market
access to obtain higher rebates, forcing drug makers to increase drug prices to
maintain revenue.

How do PBM Companies Interaction with Other Healthcare Service Providers
PBMs and Health Insurance Providers
As mentioned earlier, PBM companies primarily manage drug benefit plans
on behalf of insurance providers who may be contracted through an employer or
plans purchased separately by an individual and their family, or even a plan
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provided by the state or a federal government agency such as Medicare or
Medicaid. Either way, the PBM’s job is to control prescription drug costs for the
health plan provider (Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, n.d.). Besides
establishing and maintaining the formulary, PBM companies also manage patient
adherence programs and implement utilization management tools such as prior
authorization and tiering to steer enrollees toward certain drugs on the formulary,
which is meant to reduce costs through generic substitution of branded drugs
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 465-6).
PBM companies also monitor the prescribing, dispensing, and
administering of medications. This process is known as a drug utilization review
(DUR) and is meant to improve the allocation of health resources to ensure positive
patient outcomes while maintaining effective costs measures. If a DUR concludes
that a prescription is inappropriate, the PBM will intervene on behalf of the
insurance provider and the patient to correct the medication’s dosage avoiding
unnecessary adverse side-effects (Santerre and Neun 2010, 464).

PBMs and Drug Manufacturers
Pharmaceutical manufacturers keen to sell their products and tap into the
pool of enrollees requiring medication seek to negotiate with PBM companies for
formulary placement of their products. Drug manufacturers offer rebates to the
PBM companies to guarantee that their products are being sold on various health
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plans. PBMs keep a portion of these rebates and pass through the rest of the rebate
to the health plan provider (Commonwealth Fund 2019).

PBMs and Pharmacies
To achieve convenient access to prescriptions for health plan enrollees,
PBMs contract with pharmacies to build robust networks for dispensing
medications. Given the PBM’s purchasing power through their control over drug
utilization, PBMs can make pharmacies compete on service and quality measures
within a particular health insurance plan (Carrier 2018). Once a health plan enrollee
purchases a prescription, the PBM will reimburse the pharmacy for the physical
cost of the medication and provide a small dispensing fee for their service (Santerre
and Neun 2010, 465).

Not Just an Intermediary
While PBMs are traditionally characterized as the middlemen of the
prescription supply chain, PBM companies are also involved in several other
services to maintain cost-effective prescription drugs. One such area is disease
management which consists of the construction of databases on current prescription
practices and health outcomes to determine cost-effective treatment methods. PBM
companies are even known to operate mail order and specialty pharmacies, given
their industry knowledge of pharmacy practices and health insurance plans
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 465).
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Market Structure of the PBM Market
This section will examine the number and size distribution of PBM firms in
the US prescription drug supply chain and discuss the potential impact that a highly
concentrated PBM market may have on drug prices. Additionally, this section will
discuss PBMs’ subsidiary status within larger prescription supply chain companies
and evaluate their economic impact.

Number and Size Distribution of PBM Firms
Over the last 15 years, the number of independent PBMs has fallen, and the
size of individual PBM firms has grown. Not only have PBMs themselves
consolidated but insurance and pharmacy companies have been acquiring larger
PBM companies and vertically integrating them into their own business structures.
Today the PBM market is dominated by only three large PBM companies, Express
Scripts, OptumRx, and CVS Caremark (Carrier 2018). These PBMs themselves are
not totally independent companies but rather corporate subsidiaries of larger
healthcare corporations. Express Scripts is a subsidiary of Cigna, an insurance
provider, while OptumRx is a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group, also an insurance
provider. CVS Caremark is a subsidiary of CVS Health, which owns CVS
Pharmacy and the insurance provider Aetna (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners 2021). The market concentration of the PBM market is illustrated
by the market share of these three PBMs by total equivalent prescription claims
managed in 2018, where CVS Caremark held 30% of the market, with Express
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Scripts and OptumRx each holding 23%. While the next closest competitor
Humana Pharmacy Solutions, only had 7% (Paavola, 2019).
It is important to note that the market shares reported above are reported for
prescription claims and not revenue. That being the case, +95% of revenue
generation for the three largest PBMs are derived from the delivery of prescription
drugs through the PBMs contracted network of retail, home delivery, and specialty
pharmacies as stated in Express Scripts, OptumRx, and CVS Caremark 2018 annual
10-K filings. Furthermore, previous studies on the market share of PBM companies
find that of the $22.6 billion in gross profits in 2016, each PBM’s market share
roughly corresponds to their share of the prescription claims managed (Atteberry,
Bach, and Yu 2018).
Using these figures, we can calculate the degree of market concentration
reflected in the market concentration measures CR4 and HHI. Recall that CR4
equals the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms and ranges between 0
and 100 percent. In the case of the PBM market, we obtain a CR4 of 83% which is
well above the 60% threshold to be considered tightly oligopolistic (CVS Caremark
30% + Express Scripts 23% + Optum Rx 23% + Humana Pharmacy Solutions 7%
= 83%) (Paavola 2019). Likewise, when we consider the HHI to measure market
concentration of the 2018 US PBM market, we find a HHI of 2095 (302 + 232 + 232
+ 72 + 62 + 62 + 42 = 900 + 529 + 529 + 49 +36 + 36 + 16 = 2,095) (Paavola 2019).
Note that the remaining 4% of the market share calculated here comprises all other
PBMs in the market, so the actual HHI should be slightly less than the calculated
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HHI of 2095. Nevertheless, an HHI score of 2095 is well above the 1,800 threshold
that the DOJ regards as a highly concentrated industry.

PBM Companies Subsidiary Status and Market Concentration
One dimension of the PBM market that we should consider a little more
closely is the degree to which PBM companies are vertically integrated into other
healthcare service providers and consider how this integration affects the market
for prescription drugs. First, let us consider the PBM companies like OptumRx and
Express Scripts, which are subsidiaries of insurance companies UnitedHealth
Group and Cigna Corporation. PBMs’ ability to leverage enrollee buying power
against pharmaceutical manufacturers creates an incentive for both the PBM and
their corporate parents to favor high-priced drugs with large, negotiated rebates as
these rebates are passed through towards the health insurers. In the case of the PBM
company like CVS Caremark, where their in-network pharmacies, CVS Pharmacy,
is also owned by the same parent company CVS Health. There exists a financial
incentive to steer patients away from non-chain pharmacies in which CVS Health
does not have an ownership interest by charging lower reimbursement rates for nonCVS pharmacies. This practice would reduce patient access to affordable
medications by increasing the transaction cost of out-of-network pharmacies
(Carrier 2018).
However, there may be an economic justification for the vertical integration
of PBM companies into other prescription drug service providers like insurance
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companies and pharmacies. By producing internally, the combined firm avoids the
transactions costs of negotiating, writing, and enforcing contracts. If vertical
integration is compatible with market competition, there may be justification for
such clustering of prescription drug delivery companies as consumers will benefit
from lower prices.

Conduct of PBMs in the US Prescription Supply Chain
This section covers the promotion of pharmaceutical products through
formulary placement. Additionally, this section separately examines the pricing
behavior between PBMs and drug manufacturers, PBMs and pharmacies, and
PBMs and health insurers.

Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products
To determine which drugs to cover at what price, PBMs develop a
formulary that uses panels of experts called Pharmacy and Therapeutics or P&T
Committees to determine the most clinically appropriate medications for a given
drug class and indication. Based on the P&T Committee recommendations, PBMs
design their formularies that factor in several cost-saving components such as
biosimilar availability and negotiated rebates with drug manufacturers. Health
insurance providers can adopt PBM-developed formularies or develop their own
custom formularies, which are governed by their own P&T Committees
(Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, n.d.).
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Some examples of PBM formularies include open, closed, and tiered. In an
open formulary, the health insurer pays a portion of the cost for all drugs, regardless
of formulary status. Although, a plan sponsor may choose to exclude certain
products, such as lifestyle drugs, from coverage. In a closed formulary, the plan
sponsor will only cover drugs listed on the formulary. Drugs not listed on the
formulary are not covered unless approved through a formulary override process.
Lastly, in a tiered formulary, the plan sponsor offers different copays or other
financial incentives to encourage participants to use preferred formulary drugs but
will also pay a portion of the cost of the non-preferred drugs. For example, when a
plan sponsor offers a three-tier benefit design, it may cover non-preferred, nonformulary products on its third tier with the highest copay (Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association, n.d.).
Formularies are also constantly updated by P&T Committees who analyze
a broad range of topics, including new drug evaluations, new FDA-approved
indications for existing drugs, new clinical line extensions, and newly published or
clinical practice trends that may impact previous formulary placement decisions. In
cases where more than one product has been determined to be therapeutically
equivalent, PBMs may use the leverage provided by formulary placement in
negotiations with drug manufacturers to receive discounts on drug purchases.
PBMs argue that the therapeutically equivalent drug that offers the best value for
clients will be given preferred status on a formulary (Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association, n.d.).
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Pricing Behavior of PBMs and Drug Manufacturers
One of the main ways in which PBMs reduce the costs for consumers is
through rebates from drug manufacturers in exchange for drug placement on
formularies. A rebate in this context is a refund given to the PBM by the drug
manufacturer after the PBM has paid the full price for prescription drugs. By
altering the amounts of rebates offered, pharmaceutical manufacturers can price
their prescription medications differently for different segments of the market and
increase their profit overall. Practice is known as price discrimination.
For example, in the case of a closed formulary where certain drugs are
excluded, and consumers face the full price of off formulary products, drug makers
can effectively outbid their competition by offering higher rebates than their
competitors. The Express Scripts 2019 closed formulary lists Austedo as the
preferred medication to treat Tardive Dyskinesia, a neurological disorder, while its
competitor Ingressa is marked as excluded. We would expect that the
pharmaceutical manufacturer of Austedo offered a higher rebate amount to Express
Scripts for preferred formulary placement than Ingressa manufacturer (Express
Scripts - 2019 Preferred Formulary Exclusions).
This type of arrangement may generate conflicts of interest between
pharmaceutical manufacturers, PBMs, and patients. As the PBM company Express
Scripts in 2015 agreed to pay $60 million to settle allegations of accepting
kickbacks from the drug-maker Novartis for preferred formulary placement of its
iron chelation drug Exjade to Medicaid patients instead of a less expensive
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alternative. Given the secretive nature of rebate negotiations, it is difficult to
determine whether kickbacks

are offered willingly by pharmaceutical

manufacturers or overtly demanded by PBMs (Gray 2015). However, what is clear
is the number of drugs that are being placed on formulary exclusion lists has been
increasing over the years, with CVS Caremark alone increasing the number of
excluded medications to 124 in 2016, raising the possibility of more kickbacks and
pay-to-play schemes (Fein 2015).
In the case of a tiered formulary, the stakes are not so dire for competitors
as drug makers can offer various rebate amounts and still receive drug placement
on a tiered formulary. However, there is an economic incentive to try and offer
higher rebates than competitors to obtain the top-tier position for that therapeutic
area. The higher the tier, the lower the out-of-pocket cost to the consumer, which
builds product familiarity, habitual buying practices and cements market share for
that therapeutic area. Additionally, rebates in a tiered formulary system also can
capture a larger segment of the therapeutic market by offering different prices to
distinct price-sensitive segments of the demand market for medications. For
example, a drug manufacturer can offer a high rebate in exchange for a top-tier
placement to capture a very price-sensitive segment of the demand market, while
offering slightly less of a rebate to another plan to capture a slightly less pricesensitive segment of the demand market.
Lastly, in the case of an open formulary where the insurer pays a portion of
the medication cost regardless of formulary status, we would not expect to see a
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drug maker offer rebates because their product would be covered by the insurance
provider regardless of formulary status. Unfortunately, information on the
negotiations between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers regarding rebates is
not public knowledge and is considered a trade secret (Carrier 2018). Therefore, it
is unknown as to the prevalence of certain types of formularies and the size and
distribution of rebates offered by drug manufacturers.

Pricing Behavior of PBMs and Pharmacies
The first PBM company was started in Scottsdale, Arizona, in 1968 and was
called Pharmaceutical Card Systems. The importance of such entities in the
delivery of prescription drug services became evident as PBMs were able to pool
their patient networks together and independently negotiate lower reimbursement
rates with pharmacies and drug manufacturers. Being independent meant that PBM
companies had an incentive to pass along those negotiated savings back to their
health plan sponsors, which was ultimately passed on to consumers. However, early
in the 1990s, pharmaceutical manufacturers lured by the profit potential began to
acquire PBM companies. The FTC worried that combining PBMs with
pharmaceutical manufacturers would enable drug manufacturers to observe
competitors’ sensitive pricing information, coordinate pricing policies, and favor
their own drugs over their competitors (Feldman 2017). Empirically it would seem
that the FTC’s concerns were merited as, during the 1990s, there was a dramatic
increase in prescription drug prices (Cox Kamal, and McDermott 2019). Motivated
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by double-digit price inflation of prescription drugs, the FTC brought anti-trust
complaints against pharmaceutical manufacturers that eventually saw the break of
these drug-maker/PBM super-businesses (Feldman 2017).
Today we see a different kind of super-business between PBMs merging
with insurers and pharmacies. This scenario creates a new set of issues as a PBM
merged with a pharmacy would have an incentive to steer health plan enrollees
toward its affiliated member pharmacies instead of contracting with as many
pharmacies as possible to increase convenience and other quality care measures for
patients. These concerns appear not unfounded either. When the FTC allowed the
large pharmacy conglomerate CVS to acquire Caremark, a PBM company, in 2007,
only 12% of CVS’s retail prescription revenue came from Caremark. However, by
2014, CVS’s retail prescription revenue had increased to 35% (Feldman 2017).
Implicitly this creates significant business concerns for small independent
‘mom-and-pop’ type pharmacy businesses. An in-network pharmacy is charged
differently than an out of network pharmacy. Specifically, PBMs pay independent
pharmacies lower reimbursement rates and can expel pharmacies that complain
about their pricing techniques. A common practice known as spread pricing occurs
when a pharmacy bills a health plan for the cost of dispensing a prescription. The
PBM will keep a portion of the reimbursement in the form of a processing fee and
delivers the remainder of the difference to the pharmacy. For example, a recent
report on Medicaid in Ohio found that CVS Caremark and OptumRX billed health
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plans $2.5 billion while only reimbursing pharmacies $2.3 billion, pocketing the
$200 million difference (Carrier 2018).
Not only is spread pricing a concern for independent pharmacies, but
increasingly PBMs require that independent pharmacies pay direct and indirect
remuneration (DIR) fees. These fees are imposed after-sale and are meant to
reconcile any costs associated that were not initially captured during the
transaction. Another retroactive payment scheme used by PBMs is ‘clawbacks,’
which can lead patients to pay more in copayments than the drug costs. For
example, a University of Southern California study found that by charging a $50
copay for contraceptive and acne-treating Sprintec, a drug that costs $11.65 for a
28-day prescription, one PBM enjoyed a $38 windfall per prescription (Van Nuys,
Joyce, Ribero, and Goldman 2018).

Pricing Behavior of PBMs and Insurers
We have mentioned the straightforward way that a PBM company and a
health plan provider operate within the prescription drug delivery context. The
insurance provider pays the PBM an administration fee. In return, the PBM
manages the whole drug benefit plan while also trying to contain costs from drug
manufacturers through rebates, which the discounts are shared with the insurance
provider. However, there are other more complicated ways that a PBM and
insurance provider may want to manage high-dollar medications.
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Certain patients with particularly costly medication regimens are often
offered copayment offset programs or copay cards from pharmaceutical
manufacturers. These copay programs are meant to cover some of the cost
associated with the beneficiary’s out-of-pocket cost for a brand-name drug. With
the growth of expensive medications, there has been a corresponding increase in
manufacturers’ copay programs along with insurance plans that strongly favor high
deductible and coinsurance spending. In 2019, there were double-digit growth rates
for copay programs that are estimated to have cost pharmaceutical manufacturers
$15 billion (Fein 2020).
Usually, the payments from a copay program are counted towards a
patient’s deductible or maximum annual out-of-pocket cost. However, under a
copay accumulator policy, the insurance plan or the managing PBM does not
include the copay program or other third-party assistance such as a charitable
assistance program towards the patient’s deductible. Thus, reducing the cost that
the insurance provider must pay while increasing the out-of-pocket expenses that
the patient must pay. In response to this predatory pricing practice, The Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a rule that prohibited these
copay accumulator plans for brand name drugs that did not have a generic
equivalent. However, expensive medication regimens for illnesses are often
packaged in high deductible plans that offer no generic alternative (Fein 2020).
After being outed for shifting prescription drug costs towards patients,
insurance providers and their PBM subsidiaries developed another more subtle
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payment scheme. Copay maximizer policies that evenly divide the maximum value
of the copay program across the year. The result is that a patient’s out-of-pocket
costs are more predictable and do not vary month to month. A copay maximizer
policy has the advantage over an accumulator policy because it reduces or can
potentially eliminate the out-of-pocket expenses paid by the patient when they
purchase their medication. However, this payment policy effectively shifts the costs
to the drug manufacturers by increasing the number of average monthly copays
paid by the drug manufacturer versus the fewer, larger payments paid earlier in the
year (Fein 2020).

Performance of PBMs in the US Pharmaceutical Market
High drug prices have been a persistent problem in the US. Even though the
rate of drug price inflation has declined in the last few years, the US still spends the
most on prescription drugs than any other advanced industrial nation (Mikulic
2021). This section will examine what role PBMs have at increasing drug prices in
the US.

PBMs Role in Higher Drug Prices
There have been numerous studies to determine whether there is any merit
to pharmaceutical manufacturers’ claim that PBMs are the cause behind increasing
drug costs in the US. These studies have primarily analyzed manufacturer’s rebates
and have neglected to review other transaction costs and mark-ups. Given the
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complex and round-about nature of US health care in general, it is difficult to
determine exact cause and effect. However, a 2018 study analyzed the purchase,
distribution, and payment of prescription drugs throughout the US supply chain.
The authors’ analysis provides estimates of the revenue retained by each actor in
the process (Atteberry, Bach, and Yu 2018).
Developing a consistent and reliable dataset on estimated prescription drug
spending can be difficult because the data collected from various government
agencies and private research firms have varying criteria for what they consider in
their measurements. Therefore, the authors of the study used five different datasets
and logged what each dataset measured, and compared the dataset’s total estimate
of expenditures to others. Using financial disclosures and third-party market data,
the authors were able to quantify the overall market size based on retained revenues
of the supply chain participants (Atteberry, Bach, and Yu 2018).
The study’s results offer a striking conclusion, of the $480 billion estimates
for gross profits in the entire prescription drug supply chain, pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ share is close to 67%, with the rest divided between wholesalers
with 4%, pharmacies with 15%, providers and hospitals with 7%, insurers with 2%,
and lastly PBMs with only 5% (Atteberry, Bach, and Yu 2018). It would appear
that PBM companies themselves do not make nearly as much money compared to
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Even if we consider the vertical integration between
PBM companies, pharmacies and insurers, the total does not even reach 25%. While
PBM companies are vilified by pharmaceutical manufacturers, it is the drug
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manufacturers who are profiting the most off the current system. This intuition can
be observed by two data sets that analyze the proportion of branded versus generic
prescription drug revenues in the US and the proportion of branded versus generic
drug prescriptions dispensed in the US over the last 15 years.
Revenues for generic and branded drugs have stayed relatively consistent
over the last 15 years, where generic drugs comprise anywhere from 10-15% of
revenues and branded drugs accounting for 70-80% of revenues. However, the
proportion of branded drugs dispensed has fallen from about 40% in 2005 to only
10% in 2018 (Statista 2020). Therefore, we are forced to conclude that
pharmaceutical companies are increasing prices for their branded drugs to maintain
their record-high profitability (Porter 2021, 2).
The rebate system between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers helps
facilitate this trend of increasing prices for already high-priced branded drugs as
PBM companies receive a percentage of the rebate based on the drug’s price. PBMs
who accept pharmaceutical manufacturers’ rebates claim they pass along the
savings to insurers which are intended to be shared with enrollees. However, from
the 2018 Atteberry, Bach, and Yu study, the insurance company is not receiving
much profit from prescription drug claims. Recall insurance providers only receive
2% of the revenue share in 2016. Additionally, to counter the claim by PBMs that
they pass rebates through to insurers, it has been documented that many small
health insurance providers and employers claim that they do not receive any of the
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PBMs Role in Reducing Pharmacy Access
Recently there has been a flurry of legal and legislative actions meant to
reign in drug costs with a specific emphasis on PBM companies. In December 2020,
the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that states can regulate PBMs operating
in their jurisdictions. The suit was filed on behalf of 45 states and independent
pharmacies who claimed that PBM companies kept reimbursement rates low for
generic drugs, which have resulted in the closure of thousands of small independent
pharmacies, particularly in rural areas. The ruling allows states to regulate the rates
at which PBM companies can reimburse pharmacies (Wolf 2020).
This decision by the US Supreme Court is an encouraging sign that more
market transparency regarding the operations of PBMs and their rebates schemes
will lead to cost reduction in the private prescription drug market. With the passage
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), new rules dictated PBM
transparency when dealing with state and federal health plans. Additionally, in 2016
the CMS mandated that Medicare Part D plans and their administering PBMs must
provide all contracted pharmacies the reimbursement rates for drugs under the
maximum allowable cost (MAC) program (Hoffman-Eubanks 2018). As a result of
these transparency mandates by the federal government, the CMS has seen drug
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prices decline in their Part D plans over the last three years (Commonwealth Fund
2019).
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This research sought to answer the question of what role do PBMs have on
drug prices in the US. After analyzing of the pharmaceutical and PBM markets
through an SCP framework, we can conclude that the main driver behind the US’
high per capita costs for prescription drugs is derived from expensive brand-name
medications. The claims made by drug manufacturers who assert that PBMs are
forcing them to increase drug prices to pay for the rebates do not appear accurate.
Empirically, drug manufacturers generate most of the prescription drug supply
chain revenue, specifically through expensive brand name medications, while
simultaneously reporting record-high profits (Atteberry, Bach, and Yu 2018),
(Porter 2021, 2). If PBMs were the cause behind persistently high drug prices for
brand-name medications, we should not expect record-high profits for drug
manufacturers. Moreover, we would expect PBMs’ share of the revenue generation
in the prescription drug supply chain to be much more than 10%, especially
compared to the 67% share by drug manufacturers (Atteberry, Bach, and Yu 2018).
Therefore, drug makers claim that PBMs are the cause behind increasing drug costs
seem spurious.
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However, PBMs are not innocent either. Their claim that rebates are
channeled to health insurers and consumers in the form of savings also appears to
be bogus. As health insurance premiums increase in the US, more consumers opt
to enroll in high-deductible health plans to avoid expensive monthly premiums. It
is estimated that in 2019, 51% of the workforce is enrolled in a high-deductible
plan, the highest it has been in five years (Price 2021). Under a high deductible
plan, the cost of expensive medication regimens is shifted towards the consumer,
or in the case of government health plans, the taxpayer. In 2017, it was estimated
that insurance companies only paid for 42% of the cost for prescription drugs while
together consumers, state, and federal governments paid nearly 54% (Cubanski,
Rae, Young, and Damico 2019). If PBMs were creating savings for consumers
through drug manufacturer’s rebates, we should expect premiums and the
proportion of high deductible plans to decrease, not increase.
What does appear to be happening in the US prescription supply chain is
that US drug manufacturers are unilaterally increasing drug prices to meet quarterly
revenue projections to maintain stock prices for their investors (US House Oversite
Committee 2020, 4-5). Almost equally important is the absence of the prescription
drug supply chain’s price control mechanism, the PBM, and the purpose of the
formulary. PBMs were designed to control costs by leveraging enrollee buying
power to negotiate discounts on prescriptions and utilize generic substitution of
more expensive brand name medications. However, the industry practice by PBMs
of withholding a percentage of the negotiated rebate engenders a conflict of interest
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between the PBM and health plan enrollees. As PBMs are incentivized to favor
higher-priced medications over less expensive alternatives (Commonwealth Fund
2019). While drug manufacturers are the cause behind increasing drug costs, PBMs
are being all but being bribed from enforcing reasonable price controls on
medications through the formulary-rebate scheme.

Limitations of SCP and its Conclusions
PBM market concentration is often cited as a significant cause of increasing
drug costs in the US (Carrier 2018). As PBMs have consolidated and become
vertically integrated, drug prices have gone up. The straightforward conclusion is
to break up PBM concentration and expect drug prices to become lower. However,
this analysis is predicated heavily on the importance of market concentration and is
ultimately misguided. Using the SCP framework to analyze the PBM market, we
could come to the traditional conclusion that PBMs are leveraging their market
control to extract higher profits from drug manufacturers. On the contrary,
empirically, we see the opposite. Drug manufacturers, whose market was
determined to be much more competitive, leverage their patent monopolies to
extract record-high profits (Porter 2021, 2).
This discrepancy highlights the difficulty in evaluating the importance of
specific market competition parameters such as market concentration or barriers to
entry on the overall analysis. In this case, patent monopolies are a more critical
factor in determining market power than firm concentration. Additionally, the SCP
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framework does not help explain how the industry has developed over time and
provides little predictive capabilities of future changes. The importance of the
market competition parameters is largely unknown and constantly changing.
Therefore, any public policy meant to increase competition among PBMs
through antitrust legislation may prove to be less effective in the long run as these
measures are ultimately predicated on a single assumption that competition will
reduce drug prices. As we have seen in the past, when the FTC successfully forced
drug manufacturers to divest their ownership of PBMs, drug prices were expected
to fall. However, other agents in the prescription drug supply chain who avoided
FTC scrutiny, health insurers, and pharmacies began to successfully vertically
integrated PBMs into their business structures. While drug prices continued to
increase, most of the revenue generation did not go to the oligopolistic vertical
integrated firms like SCP would predict, but rather to drug manufacturers who had
been forced to divest their PBM businesses. Calling into question the assumption
that market competition reduces prices and giving credence to the critique of SCP
that is difficult to determine the respective importance of various market
competition parameters.
As such, any regulation that is meant to increase competition is effectively
a one-time static solution. In contrast, firms in free-market competition are dynamic
and are allowed to develop alternative business strategies to circumvent any fixed
policy solution. Subsequently, regulation based on increasing competition is
relatively limited and ineffective as firms will navigate around any business
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impediment just as drug manufacturers began to rely more heavily on their
monopolies over brand name medications to generate their revenue and exploit the
formulary-rebate scheme to side-step any oversite by PBMs.

Policy Recommendations
Leaving the production and allocation of prescription drugs to free-market
competition is a never-ending cat-and-mouse game where private firms accrue
market power over their competitors and exploit imperfect market competition to
the extent that government regulation is required to ‘correct’ market imbalances.
The new set of rules establishes a temporary status quo among firms. To become
only then exploited by a new entrepreneurial firm or business strategy requires
another round of government regulation.
If the US is serious about controlling drug prices, then the federal
government should heavily regulate the health insurance and drug manufacturing
industries and implement tight price controls for prescription medications. Such
measures would have to be so extreme as to ensure that firms cannot innovate their
way out of regulations and would need to be implemented in such a way to affect
all participants in the prescription drug supply chain. Therefore, the US should
implement a German or Swiss-style multi-payer system where health insurance is
mandatory, insurers are non-profit, and all participants in the prescription drug
supply chain are tightly regulated (Department of Professional Employees 2016).
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Under a Swiss system, responsibilities to manage the health care system are
divided among federal, provincial, and municipal authorities. The federal
government regulates financing, ensures the quality and safety of pharmaceuticals
and medical devices. While provincial governments are responsible for licensing
providers and insurers, coordinating hospital services, and subsidizing individual
premiums. Municipal governments are responsible for organizing and providing
long-term care and social support services for vulnerable populations. The entire
system is funded through enrollee premiums, provincial taxes, social insurance
contributions, and out-of-pocket payments. (Tikkanen et al. 2020).
There are three aspects to the Swiss system that the US should implement.
The first is universal coverage. Individuals without medical insurance are more
likely to go to work even when sick, prolonging pandemics, reducing productivity,
and increasing healthcare costs for all (Harbage and Furnas 2009). Additionally, a
universal mandate would eliminate the issue of paying the higher costs associated
with the uninsured who utilize emergency services more often due to the lack of
access to preventative care (Tikkanen et al. 2020). The second aspect the US should
implement is non-profit health insurance via sickness funds which are used to pay
physicians and hospitals at uniform rates (Tikkanen et al. 2020). Having insurance
be non-profit and managed by state governments would significantly reduce health
care costs as the motivation for providing health insurance would provide
affordable health care services for the public and not generate profit at the expense
of enrollees. Lastly, the US should heavily regulate health insurers and drug
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manufacturers to ensure drug prices are kept in check. In Switzerland, the Federal
Office of Public Health is the primary national regulator and is tasked with setting
price controls to include insurance premiums, pharmaceuticals, and medical
devices (Tikkanen et al. 2020).
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